theoretical perspectives of the contemporary Western legal theory without a gross distortion, because the Soviet legal doctrine was almost fully separated from the Western by the ideological iron ideological curtain. In addition, new legal science in Russia is still largely based on the principles and conceptions developed in the Soviet era. The goal of accurate analysis therefore dictates that a description of the problems of contemporary Russian legal thinking in terms of Western legal theory should be omitted from this paper -reluctantly, for the topic is certainly of interest to legal philosophers, but requires a separate and more voluminous research projectand that the exposition undertaken should follow a separate path connecting the problems of Russian Federalism only within Soviet history and the doctrine of the Constitutional Court. We cannot refrain from mentioning certain political processes that constitute the background for this doctrine, but investigation and evaluation of these processes is not the primary subject matter of this paper.
Historical sketch of the evolution of sovereignty problems in Russia
To understand the USSR legal system, it is important to understand that two parallel structures of authority existed. The first, called the "system of Soviets," was the legal structure that included government, parliament (the Congress of Soviets), quasi-free elections, legislation, courts and other attributes of a state. The second, the structure of the Communist Party (the hierarchy that protected and developed the ideology of the regime), was formally disassociated from the governance structure, but in fact dominated almost every aspect of social life. The latter ideological power took control of the machinery of Soviets. In contrast to the Soviets" system based (inter alia) on the national principle, the relevance of this principle in Party"s structure has been minor -even though the ideological structure of the Party formally acknowledged some national distinctions but they were devoid of any practical or organizational value. At the same time, the system of Soviets was organized in accordance with the mixed national-territorial principle, which implied that the political entities were formed as national ones (Russia, Ukraine, etc.), and consequently were divided into national republics and autonomous provinces. This structure completely changed the colonial system of the Russian Empire, allowing the existence of minor national republics having privileged status as compared with the numerically dominant Russian people.
The roots of this complicated power structure lie in the national policy formulated by Lenin between 1917 and 1922, the years of the civil war. In Lenin"s view, "each nation which is part of 3 Vladimir Lenin, "Resoljutsija po natsional"nomu voprosu" (Resolution on the national question), in Lenin V.I. Selected works. (Moscow, 1978) , V. 2, 95. 4 Vladimir Lenin, "O prave natsii na samoopredelenie" (About the right of nation to self-determination), in Lenin V.I. Selected works. (Moscow, 1978) , V. 2, 583 (first published in 1914). 5 "If this story sounds strange, it is because most historical accounts of Soviet nationality policy have been produced by scholars who shared Lenin's and Stalin's assumptions about ontological nationalities endowed with special rights, praised them for the vigorous promotion of national cultures and national cadres, chastised them for not living up to their own (let alone Wilsonian) promises of national self-determination, and presumed that the "bourgeois nationalism against which the Bolsheviks were inveighing was indeed equal to the belief in linguistic/cultural-therefore-political autonomy that the "bourgeois scholars" themselves understood to be nationalism." (Yuri Slezkine, "The USSR as a Communal Apartment, or How a Socialist State Promoted Ethnic Particularism", Slavic Review (1994) No. 53(2), 450). 6 "The advantage of regional autonomy consists, first of all, in the fact that it does not deal with a fiction bereft of territory, but with a definite population inhabiting a definite territory. Next, it does not divide people according to nations, it does not strengthen national barriers; on the contrary, it breaks down these barriers and unites the population in such a manner as to open the way for division of a different kind, division according to classes" (Stalin J. Marxism and the National Question, in Stalin J, Works, (Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1954), Vol. 2, 376. (Cf. also: Van Ree E., "Stalin and the National Question", Revolutionary Russia, Vol. 7, No. 2, December 1994). 7 "Social democracy must not advance "minimum" demands in the realm of present-day foreign policy... any advancement of "partial" tasks, of the "liberation of nations" within the realm of capitalist civilization, means the diverting of proletarian forces from the actual solution to the problem, and their fusion with the forces of the corresponding national bourgeois groups... The slogan of "self-determination of nations" is first of all utopian (it cannot be realized within the limits of capitalism) and harmful as a slogan that disseminates illusions. In this respect it does not differ at all from the slogans of the courts of arbitration, of disarmament, etc, which presupposes the possibility of so-called peaceful capitalism" (Nikolai Bukharin, Thezisy o prave na samoopredelenie (Theses on the Right of Self-Determination), first published in 1915, cited after: Nikolai Bukharin. Programma kommunistov -bolshevikov (The Program of Communists -Bolsheviks) (Moscow, 1918), 60. 8 The illusions of the 3 rd International withered away in the political realities of the late 1920s.
Anxious to centralize their power, Stalin and the other practically minded leaders of the Communist Party realized the necessity of bringing correctives into this national policy.
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Nevertheless, they still could not contradict Lenin"s stance on "the national question" and could not reverse the formal structure of the new Soviet state. The USSR"s particular political structure, closer to a confederation than to a federation from a legal standpoint and with a strictly centralized administration under supervision of the Communist Party, from a sociological perspective was an outcome of this strange compromise of two directly opposing strategies.
In spite of the factual application of concept of sovereignty to state construction, Soviet legal scholars tried to avoid this term. It was progressively abandoned in favour of new propagandist 7 slogans like "the friendship of nations", especially between the 1930s and 1960s. When applied, this term has been used as an synonym to the omnipotence of the public power on a certain territory, 12 or has been carefully examined to reveal the underlying capitalist economy that gave birth to this idea (in the dialectics of basis and superstructure). So, the outstanding Soviet legal scholar Jacob Magaziner wrote that "there is no higher power than authority of a state whose legal edicts have supremacy, and it is this property of state authority which is otherwise called sovereignty". 13 It is important to note that the first Soviet textbook on constitutional law defined sovereignty as "supremacy of the state power which makes this power unlimited and independent inside the country and runs autonomous foreign policy in international relations".
14 Such a definition has nothing particular for the "bourgeois" legal theory but it is interesting to see how the new legal ideology of the Soviet state returned to the paths of traditional political science. This opinion was echoed later on by many legal theorists among whom it is possible to invoke Molodtsov who defined sovereignty as "territorial supremacy of a state" 15 or Klimenko who identified it with unity of imperium and dominium that is exercised by a state over all the people within the territory it possesses. 16 This understanding was based on conflation between the factual (political) power and the legal power, and sovereignty was perceived in the Hobbsean perspective as the authorities" mechanism of control over the population. This point of view still remains persuasive for many contemporary Russian lawyers, as sovereignty was and still is being conceived as a feature of a political entity characterising its integrity and indivisibility, its monopoly to use coercive power. 17 No pluralisation and dispersion of power inside the state authority mechanism was possible in this theoretical framework that identified the very existence of a state with the presence of a centralized power. Again, this conception of sovereignty was nothing new as compared with the "bourgeois" political science (recall the Weberian definition of the state), but the shift in the Soviet legal theory from the prerevolutionary programs of the Bolshevik leaders was significant. From this theoretical standpoint, the purpose of separation of the sovereign powers between several territorial levels or the concept of a divided sovereignty seemed and still seems to be an assault against the idea of state. The identification of power with law led to neglect of the aspects of legitimacy of the authorities, so that the disputes about territorial 8 integrity, independence and sovereignty turned into quarrels about the relative force of the conflicting authorities. 18 Given that the concept of legitimacy was discarded once and for all by the Soviet legal theory as ideological device of capitalism, a description of the formal properties of state power could be based only on sovereignty. This sequence nevertheless was not able to concuss the ideological premises of the Soviet legal theory, which studied a mummified centralized apparatus of the USSR inside which no legal conflict of powers was conceivable.
The the self-government of people through the Soviets, making the USSR the paradigmatic example of a fully centralised state. 19 Nothing new appeared after the crackdown of the Communist rule in the early 1990s, when the new authorities followed the traditional methods of hierarchical power structuring. It has been maintained by some researchers that this policy was just a repetition of the Russian mentality accustomed to conceive the power as something impartible and monolithic, based on unilateral order of subordination. 20 The "dissident" ideas about diffusion and dispersion of sovereignty in the 20th century were always "not at home" in the 18 Surely, from the sociological standpoint it is so, but legal perspective allows bring these disputes on the level of constitutional debates about rights, freedoms, liberties and guarantees rather than stay solely on bargaining about more power among the authorities. 19 Cf. enemies of the Soviet ideology because such ideas were considered to provoke rivalry between the working classes" parties.
Based on the formal doctrine of national freedom (self-determination) and on the real practice of rigid centralization, the Soviet legal theory (the basic standards of which were formulated by Andrej Vishinski in 1938 at the first colloquium of the Soviet legal theorists) has thus promoted two conflicting values. When both values were subject to the ultimate communist ideology and the political life was thoroughly controlled, no normative conflict arose. Unfortunately for those who suffered from the consequent wars, after the crackdown of the system the repulsion against the relicts of the Soviet national policy was so strong that Russia in 1990 proclaimed itself independent from the Soviet Union: this example was followed by other members of the USSR, and by the national autonomies inside Russia (called "republics", each of them having its own "constitution") a well. Among other things, it meant the end of the USSR. There was no normative conflict as self-determination was proclaimed as a supreme principle by all ex-USSR countries. The vacuum in legislation of these countries at the end of the 1980s left a room for their autonomies to adopt the same strategy. This problem persisted in Moldova, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, which still have "sovereign" autonomies not controlled by the central government. In Russia this was not only a question for Chechnya but for many other national republics that declared their sovereignty in the early 1990s.
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One of the major factors, surely not the only one, was the incoherence of the application of the legal terminology and in balancing of the conflicting societal values by the politicians, judiciary, legislators, and all those engaged in legal discourse. As noted above, the vocabulary of the Soviet lawyers was quite different from the dictionary of the Western lawyers, with many ideological concepts integrated into the legislation such as "free self-determination of nations", and with many traditional terms banned from it as "bourgeois", like those of "sovereignty" or "rule of law". Another factor was that the initial position of the newly elected Russian government headed by Yeltsin was to play the "trump of sovereignty" in the struggle against the remnants of the Soviet government headed by Gorbachev. It resulted not only in the breakup of the USSR but also in the growth of nationalist movements inside Russia. When declaring Russia"s sovereignty in 1990, Yeltsin told the regional leaders, "and you take as much as sovereignty as you can bear". 23 While the new Russian constitution was under discussion until its adoption in 1993, the new authorities of Russia entered forty-two treaties with its constituent entities (such republics as Tatarstan, Dagestan, and many others) where the both convening parties (Russia and one of its republics) regarded each other as sovereign states. 24 By negotiating treaties with members of the Federation that defined the powers they can exercise, thereby creating a radically asymmetrical federal system, the federal government hoped to save the country from disintegration. Thus, the political compromise was prioritized, and much less attention was paid to the terminology. 25 There are numerous references to sovereignty in these Federation" which "possesses all the plenitude of the state sovereignty on its territory" (art. 64).
The provisions of the Tartar constitution were even more provocative, holding this Republic as "a sovereign state, as a subject of the international law" (art. 61) without even mentioning that Tatarstan is part of the Russian Federation. The Constitution of the Northern Ossetia proclaimed that this Republic is "the only holder of the state power on its territory" (art. 4), and is "a sovereign state which in pursuance of its freewill enters the Russian Federation" (art. 61). With some changes in modality and in terms, these formulations were repeated in the basic laws of other republics. These ideas disclosed the clear political intentions of the regional leaders to full separation of the two levels of power through proclaiming self-determination of the regions.
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Nevertheless, this process of self-determination soon showed its detrimental signs, which were the bloody conflicts in Chechnya and in other Russian Caucasian republics, endorsing the 24 Surely, the terms of these treaties varied depending on the compromise reached between the regions and the Federation (cf. Preamble to the Federal Treaty between the Russian Federation and Tatarstan Republic "On demarcation of competencies and on mutual delegation of powers between the federal organs of the Russian Federation and the state authorities of the Tatarstan Republic" as of 15.02.1994 where Tatarstan is held as a state associated with Russia). E.g., the federal treaties were also entered with some ordinary regions which did not claim any sovereignty, and thus the sovereignty clause has not been mentioned anywhere. opposite understanding of sovereignty as the indivisible power of higher state authorities.
Several years later, the opposite process of reintegration of Russia started where several factors can be articulated; among them is the doctrine of the Constitutional Court of Russia, which will be a subject for the analysis below.
Sovereignty and the doctrine of the Constitutional Court of Russia
The Constitutional Court of Russia marked its legal position on the sovereignty problem in some illustrious precedents. The first such precedent took place as early as in 1992 in the Tatarstan case (Decision of 13.02.1992), where the Court held that proclamation of state sovereignty by a national autonomy contravenes international law, as the latter does not allow referring to this principle in situations threatening the integrity of another sovereign state.
The conflict that brought this case to the Court broke out in 1992 when, based on the provisions of the republican constitution, the regional parliament adopted a law on referendum. This referendum was intended to test the willingness of the population in Tatarstan to be independent from Russia. In its own terms, "to go ahead with constructing the republic of Tatarstan as an independent and sovereign state belonging to the international community as its full-fledged member". The president of Tatarstan, Mr. Shajmiev, stood firmly on the point that no literal conflict with the Federal Constitution could be found in this case, as there is no interdiction for the constituent republics of the Federation to fully or partly possess sovereignty. Moreover, the Russian Constitution recognised that republics could participate in the international affairs and international treaties. Therefore, no discrepancy in terms might be stated, and the Constitutional Court was not competent to speak instead of the Constitution when this latter was silent. The federal treaties between the Federation and the constituent republics provide the best proofs thereto. Suffice it to say that Shajmiev in 1993 sent an official letter to Yeltsin with information that Tatarstan would not "enter the Russian Federation" in case no mutually acceptable treaty was entered into.
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The Count nevertheless dissented with Tatarstan"s leader and held that, both in Russia and abroad, the sovereignty concept excludes the legal possibility of the Federation and its members being equal in international relations. The federal treaties have effect on constitutional laws. The fact that the Federal Constitution is silent on sovereignty of the constituent republics means that the only subject of sovereignty in Russia is "the multinational Russian people" which is mentioned as the "vehicle of sovereignty in Russia".
Basing on these findings, the Court held void the mentioned law along with the corresponding provisions of the Tatarstan Constitution. The reasoning of the regional authorities was reversed by the Constitutional Court, which found that Tatarstan cannot be an independent member of the international community even by authority of plebiscite. It is noteworthy that the Court did not reason in pursuance of the norms and principles of the municipal constitutional laws, as these were silent on this matter and even rather favourable to self-determination principle. The Court"s argumentation rested on the principles of the international law, thus being a symptom of assessment, following the doctrine of "multinational people of Russia" which alone through its parliament or through a plebiscite can decide on territorial integrity of the country, and be sovereign in this sense. The Court underlined that the right to self-determination "cannot be interpreted as sanctioning or encouraging any actions which could lead to dismemberment or to a full negation of territorial integrity or of political unity of the sovereign and independent States".
As the warfare in Chechnya (in the Russian legal parlance, a "counter-terrorist operation") has been declared by the Russian parliament, no normative conflict between this law and the Federal Constitution has been found.
The next serious shift in evolution of the sovereignty doctrine of the Constitutional Court occurred after changes in the power balance between central and regional authorities after Putin"s arrival to power. 29 One of the main expectations of people towards this new leader was a kind of potentate that would allow bringing together the disintegrated country. 30 Several federal laws were adopted drastically delimiting the prerogatives of the autonomous regions, and even though no amendments were added to the Constitution, the understanding of federalism in Russia underwent a remarkable change. The idea of a great united people (the "Rossians" Here the Court unambiguously ruled that no reference or even allusion could be made to sovereignty of the constituent republics which have the same status that other regions/provinces of Russia, and that the provisions of the federal treaties are not sources of the constitutional law equal to the Constitution itself, having only a transitory character. Resting on these findings, the Court also held illegitimate the clauses about the nations of the republics as the source of state power in these republics. This conclusion was based on a specific construction of article 4 of the Federal Constitution where part 1 establishes that sovereignty of the Federation covers all its territory, and part 3 provides that the Federation guarantees integrity and indivisibility of its territory: from this normative liaison the Court concluded that sovereignty is another term for territorial integrity. A particular sense was also attributed to the wording of art. 5 of the Russian Constitution which uses a term "state" for the republics (mentioning them as "republics (states)" in the list of the constituent members of the Federation). In spite of the plain meaning of this constitutional provision which describes the republics as states (gosudarstva), the Court found that this term of "state" in reality did not mean "state" as a political unity of people, but a kind of national autonomy which must disappear after the transitory period of the Russian history is over. This distortion of the plain meaning of words is characteristic for the new doctrine of the Court, which preferred to disregard the real significance the constitutional terms had in the early 1990s (being a equilibrium between the weak central power and separatist regions) and to invest into the Constitution the new political paradigms.
But the issue is still far from being resolved. Regionalism in Europe, the rise of international organizations powers and the globalisation processes give feedback to these tendencies so that there appeared a division in the Russian jurisprudence between partisans of the Westphalian system with centralised states on the one hand, 35 and the supporters of the free market and soft law ideology which purports to hollow out the sovereignty principle on the other hand. 36 Argumentation in favour of strong central power has become one of the main slogans of the ruling party ("United Russia"), which explicitly maintains that any decrease in the federal government"s power would ineluctably lead to the disintegration of Russia. 37 This slogan evidently goes along with the authoritarian assertions of the United Russia"s political program.
At the same time, the liberals cannot hide that they are also aware that weakening of the central th of April, 1991 "On changes and amendments into the Constitution (Basic Law) of Tartar 
